National Conversation on Immigration

Final report: executive summary

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September 2018
Executive summary

The National Conversation on Immigration is the biggest-ever public consultation on immigration and integration.

Immigration has remained one of the most salient and divisive issues for the public in recent years, and a factor in many voters’ decisions in the EU referendum. Leaving the EU presents an opportunity to reform Britain’s immigration policy; to address public concerns about immigration and put in place a system that works for employers, is fair to migrants and receiving communities and commands public trust and support. But we believe that this confidence cannot be fully restored without engaging the public in a debate about their views and concerns, and what policies we should now put in place.

The current immigration system does not command public trust and support. At the same time, employers have expressed frustrations about the difficulty in recruiting staff from overseas. Organisations working with refugees remain concerned about backlogs and the quality of initial asylum decisions.

British Future and HOPE not hate conducted the National Conversation on Immigration to involve the public in the debates and decisions about what to do now. We aimed to:

■ Create an evidence base of public views on immigration.
■ Examine if it is possible to build a consensus on immigration policy and, if so, what steps are needed to do so.
■ Engage those with less voice in policy decisions: for example young people and those who live outside big cities.
■ Advocate for deeper, on-going public engagement from the Government by demonstrating the value of such work when done well.

METHODOLOGY

The National Conversation on Immigration had three main components:

■ 60 visits to towns and cities across the UK, chosen to offer a mix of places with different experiences of migration, as well as political and geographic variety.
■ An online survey, hosted on our website, completed by 9,327 people over an 18-month period.
■ A nationally representative survey of 3,667 UK adults undertaken in June 2018 by ICM. Four ‘boosts’ were included to the sample to enable more detailed analysis to be undertaken. These boosts comprised: 700 adults resident in Scotland; 250 adults resident in Northern Ireland; 400 adults born outside the UK; and 500 minority ethnic adults.

In each location we ran a citizens’ panel made up of members of the public, recruited to be representative of the local area. Basing our conversation on a discussion guide, the citizens’ panels discussed the approach that they would like to see the Government take to different types of migration. They were also asked their views about integration. Crucially, participants considered what would need to change in order for the Government to get their support for its handling of immigration. In a separate meeting in each location we met with local stakeholders, including councils, business groups and civil society organisations.

We were given the opportunity to work alongside the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, which undertook its own inquiry on the future direction of immigration policy. Our findings were given as evidence to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on building consensus on immigration policy, and informed the Committee’s recommendations.
OUR FINDINGS

Leaving the EU offers a window of opportunity to reform immigration policy, and to put in place a system that works for everyone. The evidence we have gathered from the National Conversation on Immigration suggests that this task is possible, given sufficient leadership and political will. We have found:

Most people are ‘balancers’

Most people who have taken part in the citizens’ panels are what we have termed ‘balancers’, who see both the pressures and gains of immigration. Typically, the citizens’ panels described the benefits of migration, the skills that migrants bring to the UK and the jobs that they fill. Migrants who worked in the NHS were seen as characterising the best qualities of migration. At the same time, participants also voiced concerns and questions about migration, with the nature of these concerns often varying from place to place.

Face-to-face discussion is different to the online debate on immigration

While the National Conversation on Immigration showed that there is a moderate and balancing majority on immigration, this is not reflected everywhere. We found considerable difference between the face-to-face discussions in the citizens’ panels and an online debate dominated by relatively few voices, where those with stronger views at either end of the spectrum are most likely to voice their opinions. The difference between online and offline debate was profound in the National Conversation on Immigration, where we were able to contrast the views expressed in the citizens’ panels, the nationally representative ICM research and the online open survey.

The open survey was taken online by 9,327 people, with its responses showing the polarisation of the online debate. As in the citizens’ panels and the nationally representative ICM research, we asked those who took part in the open online survey an impact question: “On a scale of 1-10, with 1 very negative and 10 very positive, do you feel that immigration has had a positive or negative impact on the UK, including your local area.”

A majority of the online survey respondents chose either the minimum or the maximum score: almost one-third (31%) gave a score of 1 out of 10 and a quarter (23%) gave a score of 10 out of 10. This helps to explain the highly polarised nature of online debate. These most strongly-held views were much rarer in the nationally representative ICM research, where just 15% of the ICM sample chose either end of the spectrum: in ICM’s representative poll, just 8% chose the lowest score of one, and just 7% the highest score of ten.

Figure 1 below shows the responses to the open online survey and nationally representative ICM research together, highlighting the difference between online debate and overall public opinion.

![Figure 1: On a scale of 1-10, do you feel that immigration had a positive or negative impact on the UK, including your local community?](image-url)
Trust in the Government and politicians is low

Among those who took part in the citizens’ panels there was very little trust in the Government to manage immigration, both adding to and reflecting a broader mistrust of politicians and politics. Just 15% of respondents in the ICM research felt that the Government had managed immigration into the UK competently and fairly. The citizens’ panels did not trust the Government to enforce immigration policy competently or follow through policy commitments. High profile policy failures such as the Windrush scandal, failure to deport foreign national prisoners and failure to meet the net migration target added to political mistrust.

Many participants felt that politicians had tried to shut down open debate about immigration or had used biased or inaccurate statistics when they had been forced to comment on immigration. Demands for greater transparency were common in almost all the citizens’ panels, along with a request not to use immigration for party political advantage.

Contribution, control and fairness were common themes in our discussions

The citizens’ panels wanted migrants who come to the UK to make a contribution, through the skills they bring, the jobs they do and through taxation. But detailed and often abstract economic arguments about fiscal and economic impacts did not resonate with the citizens’ panels. Rather, economic contribution was seen through a ‘common sense’ fiscal lens, with participants having positive views about migrants who are seen as tax-payers and negative views about those who work off the books, send money home or are perceived as coming to the UK to claim benefits.

Control was also a key topic in many citizens’ panel discussions. Many of the concerns about immigration centred on sovereignty and the UK government’s lack of control over EU migration flows, or the belief that immigration regulations were not enforced. Security and criminality were also themes that were raised, with participants concerned that would-be migrants were not vetted to exclude violent extremists and those with serious criminal records.

While the citizens’ panels wanted immigration to be controlled, they also wanted the system to be fair, both to migrants and to receiving communities. There was also a consensus that migrants and refugees must be treated fairly and humanely. No-one in the citizens’ panels wanted law-abiding EU nationals who were presently living in the UK to be asked to return home after the UK left the EU. The Windrush scandal received media coverage towards the end of the National Conversation on Immigration visits, with the last citizens’ panel unanimously agreeing that this group had been treated unfairly.

Local differences

As well as common themes there were some striking local differences in the issues that citizens’ panels raised, the salience of immigration as an issue, and the balance between the perceived benefits and disadvantages of immigration. We found that immigration is a national issue, but that perceptions are often framed through a ‘local lens’. Where migration is seen as putting pressures on public services or is associated with badly-maintained private rental housing and neighbourhood decline, there is usually less public consent for immigration.

Local experiences of integration matter. It was clear that social contact with migrants has a major impact on how the citizens’ panels viewed immigration and immigrants. The extent to which the participants had such social contact differed from place to place. Where participants had social contact with migrants, they were able to base their opinions on these interactions, rather than on what we have called ‘community narratives’ drawn from the media and peer group debate. In places where migrants are less well-integrated into their local communities, negative public views tended to predominate.

Geography matters, too, and we have been struck by the differences in attitudes to immigration between the UK’s major cities and the rest of the UK. There are various explanations of this trend: cities often have a longer history of immigration, so their residents are less likely to be disconcerted by recent immigration from the EU. City residents tend to have more social contact with migrants, factor that seems to be a key driver of more liberal attitudes. Higher proportions of graduates live in big cities, which also tend to have a younger age profile; both are social characteristics associated with more positive attitudes to immigration.

Personal circumstance also has an influence. Age, qualifications, social grade, migration, ethnicity as well as opportunities and deprivation. We found that areas where socioeconomic conditions are more favourable, and there are more opportunities, attitudes tend to be more open towards immigration.
Most people want EU migration to be better managed

Many of the concerns expressed in the citizens’ panels focused on migration from the EU. Participants felt that the UK government had little control over who came here and that they were unable to exclude those who presented a security risk or had unspent criminal convictions. There was very little understanding of the current free movement rules, with most of the citizens’ panels believing that EU nationals could move to the UK and have immediate- and for some, preferential- access to the welfare system.

Many of the concerns that the citizens’ panels held about EU migration focused on the local impact that it had, particularly on public services and on neighbourhoods with large amounts of rental accommodation.

Most participants wanted to make changes to the rules covering this type of migration and we spent time discussing future policy options to regulate EU migration after Brexit. Options we discussed included keeping or reforming free movement, bringing in caps or quotas for low-skilled migrant workers from the EU, temporary visa regimes, or using the same system for EU and non-EU migrants.

There was very little support for temporary visas, with participants feeling that regulations would not be enforced by the Home Office and that such an approach would stop migrants putting down roots, learning English and integrating. A minority of those who took part in the citizens’ panels wanted to keep the current free movement rules. Overall, participants were fairly equally divided between a cap on low-skilled migration from the EU or a system that treats EU and non-EU nationals in the same way.

The political challenges of Brexit

Whatever post-Brexit immigration system the Government wishes to put in place, it must be capable of securing public support. To secure a Brexit deal with the EU, policy proposals must also be negotiable with the EU27, in a process that will inevitably result in compromises.

On this issue, there was most division between Leave and Remain voters, both in the citizens’ panel discussions and the nationally representative ICM research. Four in ten (39%) of those who took part in the ICM research were willing to keep the current free movement rules if it meant a better deal for British business. But 33% of respondents felt that the UK should not offer a preferential immigration deal to the EU, even if this limited the trade deal that the UK could strike.

These options also divided respondents along social lines and by political affiliation, much more so than the other policy choices we posed in the survey. Remain voters (59%), Labour voters (50%), 18-24s (47%), students (56%) and those living in large cities (45%) were more likely to favour compromising on freedom of movement in return for a better deal for business. In contrast 53% of Leave voters believed that the UK should not offer a preferential immigration deal to the EU, even if business would lose out, compared with 16% of Remain voters. Conservative voters, older people, those without higher level qualifications and those who live outside big cities were also more likely to favour this option.

Clearly, developing a future immigration system that commands public support and is negotiable with the EU will be a difficult task for the Government. But changes to immigration policy alone will not address the concerns that the public hold on immigration. To secure public consent for the immigration that the economy needs, the Government will have to take action against rogue landlords, enforce labour standards, promote integration and make sure that public services and housing supply can respond to increased demand.

Anti-Muslim prejudice is widespread

The National Conversation on Immigration discussions were open, decent and constructive. We have shown that it is possible to have such a discussion about a controversial subject such as immigration. However, we are concerned about the prevalence of anti-Muslim prejudice, which we found to be widespread in parts of the UK, particularly in places where the local population has little social contact with Muslim communities.

Anti-Muslim prejudice took different forms, with a tendency to stereotype Muslims as a homogeneous community whose values and lifestyle are incompatible with the British way of life. In some citizens’ panels, participants talked about Muslims “taking over” UK cities. They believed that British culture was under threat because people were ‘forced’, usually by schools and councils, to pander to “political correctness” and the sensitivities of Muslims.

Anti-Muslim prejudice underpinned broader views about immigration. In many places, the citizens’ panels’ attitudes to Muslims impacted on how they saw refugees and sometimes references to Muslims and refugees were mixed or conflated in the discussion.
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence of the National Conversation on Immigration highlights the importance of dialogue in reaching a consensus on immigration policy. Face-to-face discussion gives people a chance to express their views on immigration, debate issues with others, balance positives and negatives and, in many cases, come to a consensus. We believe that the Government needs to consider how to institutionalise public engagement on highly salient issues such as immigration.

Winning public trust will require change both nationally and locally. We have to address the public’s desire to see immigration competently managed and better controlled at national level. There is also a need to address local impacts. There is no single or immediate solution that will restore the immigration system to good health: rather a series of steps and policy changes that will need time to take effect and build consensus.

We believe that a future immigration system that works for everyone in the UK must meet seven tests. It will need to be:

- Workable for the economy and employers;
- Simple and deliverable as policy;
- Fair to migrants;
- Fair to local communities and should not lead to negative impacts;
- Capable of securing public consent across social and political divides;
- Capable of securing political support in the UK; and
- In the case of EU migration, changes to policy need to be capable of securing support from the EU27.

Politicians must also address widespread mistrust in the Government’s ability to manage migration competently, if they are to secure public support for the immigration that the UK economy needs. It is also clear that the immigration system needs to be more transparent, with ministers and officials held accountable for failures. But changing immigration policy alone will not unlock this consent. Dealing with local pressure points and promoting integration is also key to building an immigration system that has public support.

Drawing from the evidence we have gathered, the National Conversation on Immigration makes 47 recommendations which, if implemented, would help create an immigration system that works for employers, is fair and humane and has broad public support. We have set these out in full in our final report and in summary below. Unless otherwise indicated, these recommendations are directed at the Government.

Build confidence in the immigration system

1. **Institutionalise public consultation through an official National Conversation on Immigration and Integration which feeds into the three-year plan and Parliament’s Annual Migration Day.**

   We need a sustained and ongoing commitment to public engagement across the nations and regions of the UK, in the form of an official National Conversation on Immigration. This project has shown that such a conversation can be conducted in such a way that all voices are heard, not just the loudest. It should be coordinated by the Migration Advisory Committee, in partnership with local authorities, combined authorities and the devolved administrations. A three-year immigration plan and a House of Commons Migration Day report should become the focal point for this.

2. **Publish a three-year plan for migration to replace the net migration target, with this plan reviewed every year in Parliament on an Annual Migration Day.**

   A three-year migration strategy, led by the Cabinet Office with input from the Home Office, devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and other relevant bodies, should replace the Government’s net migration target. If the Government decides to include numeric targets in its three-year plan, these should be based on robust evidence and treat different types of immigration differently. The plan should be reviewed each year in an Annual Migration Day in Parliament.
3. Review the threshold for immigration policy change that requires legislation.

Setting a lower threshold on the type of change that requires primary legislation and a parliamentary vote would help put in place greater transparency on immigration policy, and prevent problems from arising.

4. Task the Migration Advisory Committee to set up an independent and simple-to-understand, public-facing website that explains immigration policy and sets out key statistics.

5. Require that lay members sit on Asylum and Immigration Tribunals

### Improving the performance of the Home Office

6. Make sure that the Home Office has the resources to deliver on its aims.

In 2015 and before the EU referendum the Government committed to making the borders and immigration function in the Home Office fully self-funded by 2019-2020. We recommend that plans to make borders and immigration self-funding are reconsidered, and that the Migration Advisory Committee is tasked with calculating how much revenue and capital funding is needed for the Home Office to fulfil its immigration control function efficiently and fairly. Politicians also need to promote a more open and honest debate and acknowledge that the level of border controls that the public wants will entail a larger Home Office budget, ultimately funded through taxation.

7. The Government should support high quality and speedy asylum decision-making through investment in staff and the merging of the Home Office budget for asylum determination with the Ministry of Justice budget for asylum appeals.

The UK’s asylum system should be fair, efficient and humane. At present it is beset with errors and backlogs. In 2017, 36% of asylum-seekers who appealed against a negative decision were later granted refugee status - a situation that causes anxiety for refugees while also incurring an unnecessary expense for the taxpayer. We recommend that the Government merge the Home Office budget for initial asylum determination with the Ministry of Justice budget for appeals. This would be a cost-neutral measure that would incentivise high quality initial decision-making.

8. Reduce the administrative burden placed on individual users of the immigration system, as well as business and university sponsors

Immigration control must be robust and must not compromise on security and integrity. At the same time, the delivery of immigration control should avoid unnecessary and expensive bureaucracy. We welcome the Home Secretary’s commitment to simplifying immigration law but we believe that there are still opportunities to reduce unnecessary and costly bureaucracy, particularly in relation to Tier 2 work visas, Tier 4 student visas, sponsorship rules and the process by which EU nationals can obtain British citizenship.

9. Make sure that immigration policy is flexible enough to take into account the best interests of children in decision-making.

Children born in the UK should have the right to citizenship, and families should not be unfairly separated.

10. Pilot immigration enforcement activities and evaluate their effectiveness in reducing illegal immigration, before their wider application.

The Government should not proceed with policy that is ineffective in achieving its aim or which discriminates against UK citizens.

11. Build a culture of openness within the Home Office with a commitment to better stakeholder engagement in all divisions.

12. Parliamentarians, civil society, business groups and universities should make better use of migration transparency data to hold the Home Office to account.
Migration for work – a new post Brexit immigration system

13. Involve the public in decisions about future EU migration policy through an official National Conversation on Immigration, and a public information campaign after the Brexit negotiations are concluded.

14. Give a unilateral commitment to EU nationals currently living in the UK that their status is secure in the event of the UK leaving the EU without a final deal.

15. Introduce a mandatory Home Office registration system and Canadian-style criminal vetting for future migration from the EU.

16. Introduce controls on some or all low-skilled migration from the EU, through a bar on recruiting EU nationals into jobs that pay less than the National Living Wage and/or a work visa system.

Under the first of these proposals employers, including employment agencies, would be barred from recruiting EU nationals into jobs that paid less than the hourly National Living Wage. We believe that this policy would encourage employers to increase recruitment from the domestic labour market, and could address some of the real and documented labour market impacts of migration on jobs and wages. Such a system would need to be enforced: currently there are too many workers who are underpaid in the UK, despite the protection of National Minimum Wage and Living Wage. We consider that this proposal would be negotiable in the event of a close UK-EU partnership, such as one in which Britain remains in the single market with reforms.

A preferential work-permit system for EU nationals, covering some or all low-skilled work, would involve EU nationals registering with the Home Office on arrival in the UK. Should they then find a low-skilled job, they would also be required to secure a work permit from the Home Office before they took up this employment. EU nationals who were taking up high- and medium-skilled work would be exempt from this process. Employers would be responsible for designating the skill level of the jobs they wish to be filled, using the existing National Qualification Framework codes and the Standard Occupational Classification codes, which are already used in UK immigration policy. Such an approach could act as an overarching emergency brake, with the number of new work permits made available each year to be set at a pre-agreed level. We consider that this would be negotiable in the event of a UK-EU deal that takes the UK out of the single market.

These proposals present policy options that are negotiable with the EU in the event of either a close deal with the EU, remaining in the single market with reforms, or a UK-EU partnership outside the single market – such as the Chequers proposals or an alternative, bespoke arrangement. If these two policies do not prove to be negotiable, the UK government faces a stark choice between sovereignty over immigration control and single market access.

17. Simplify the Tier 2 visa system covering the recruitment of migrant workers from outside the EU and reduce the £30,000 pay threshold for Tier 2 visas.

18. Make sure that all migrant workers – from outside and within the EU - have clear and affordable routes to settlement and British citizenship, which should act as a lever to encourage integration in the UK.

19. Make sure that HMRC and the Gangmaster and Labour Abuse Authority have sufficient resources to enforce that National Minimum Wage and National Living Wage and other labour standards.

20. Sector skills councils should be required to work with the Government, the further education sector, employers and professional bodies to reduce the UK’s dependence on migrant workers.

International student migration

22. Aim to bring the number of international students up to 500,000, a 13% increase, over the next five years.

23. Provide immediate clarity on the status of EU students after the Brexit transition period.

24. Introduce a new post-study work visa for graduates of STEM subjects, with quotas allocated to Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and each English region.

25. Establish a new wave of university building to spread the benefits that higher education brings more widely across the UK.

Universities bring economic and social benefits to the communities in which they are located. They encourage skilled jobs, boost local economies through student spending and have been integral to the regeneration of some towns and cities. The benefits that universities bring, however, are not evenly spread across the UK.

These new institutions should specialise in regional economic and cultural strengths and have strong business and community links, with obligations to deliver additional courses below degree level, to support lifelong learning and to boost the skills of the local population.

26. All universities should produce a community plan, involving university staff and local residents in its development and implementation.

Protecting refugees

27. Civic leaders and politicians of all parties should stand up for the principle of refugee protection.

28. The Government should maintain its commitment to resettling refugees in the UK through the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme, the Vulnerable Children Programme and the Gateway programme for other groups of vulnerable refugees.

29. Allow asylum-seekers to work if their case has not been decided within six months.

Most asylum-seekers want to work and there is strong public support to allow them to do so. There is little evidence to suggest that allowing asylum-seekers to work after six months would act as a ‘pull factor’ increasing asylum arrivals. We believe that there would be many benefits from such a policy change; it would help the process of social and economic integration and prevent some of the loneliness and poor mental health experienced by asylum-seekers and refugees. Such a policy change would also discourage asylum-seekers from working ‘off the books’ and would address some of the public concerns about welfare dependency and groups of bored young men loitering in town centres.

30. Councils, civil society and faith groups should continue work to broaden public support for refugee protection.
Managing the local impacts of migration

31. Require organisations that employ more than 250 workers in a particular local authority to account to that local authority for any increase in employees, either in a new organisation or over a threshold of 20% of the existing workforce, with regard to minimising housing market impacts of internal and international migration and encouraging integration.

Businesses, including employment agencies, must take more responsibility for ameliorating some of the negative impacts on local housing markets that rapid internal and international migration can bring to an area. This proposal must also apply to staff who have contracts with employment agencies. This obligation should be used to start a conversation as to what businesses might do to promote integration, for example, by making space available for workplace-based English language classes and encouraging staff to attend.

32. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the devolved administrations should better enforce standards in the private rental sector and look at better ways to reverse neighbourhood decline.

33. Introduce a minimum three-year tenancy term for private renters

We support the proposal put forward by Secretary of State for Communities for the introduction of a minimum three-year tenancy term, with a six-month break clause. This would help renters put down roots, and give landlords longer term financial security. This would also help to reduce undesirable population churn that is seen in some of the neighbourhoods experiencing decline.

34. Use the next Comprehensive Spending Review to secure extra funding for and development of the Controlling Migration Fund, and look at ways to deal with the local impacts of migration outside England.

35. Aim to reduce the UK’s socio-economic and geographic divides by using the opportunities of the 2018 Industrial Strategy and the next Comprehensive Spending Review to make sure that smaller conurbations and rural areas receive a fair share of infrastructural investment.

36. Have an honest political debate about public spending and demographic change.

Integration

37. Make integration a policy priority in all four nations of the UK.

Integration is key to building public consent for immigration. There is a need in all parts of the UK for over-arching integration strategies that frame integration as an ‘everybody’ issue and tackle age and income divides as well as those associated with faith and ethnicity. These strategies must be capable of securing cross-party support and there needs to be recognition that integration requires long-term policy commitment.

38. Increase political accountability on integration through a House of Commons permanent committee on integration and opportunity.

In addition annual integration summits, similar to those held in Germany, would provide a focal point for policy and public debate about the progress made and future challenges.

39. Oblige local authorities to develop an integration strategy, in consultation with the public, and make sure that they have the resources and skills to deliver it.

40. Take action to make sure adult migrants, including asylum-seekers and refugees, have access to English language classes in all parts of the UK.

41. Review language support for children who speak English as an additional language, with the aim of reducing postcode lotteries of provision.

42. Work with local partners to encourage social integration through a Local Citizenship Service offer, mandatory school linking and sustainable funding for parks and leisure centres.
Addressing resentment, prejudice and hate

43. Make sure that all local authorities have long-term strategies for reducing hate crime, prejudice and intolerance.

44. Put pressure on social media companies to ensure that they promptly remove social media content that breaches existing hate speech polices.

45. Provide coordinated training opportunities to groups such as youth and community workers on holding ‘difficult conversations’.

46. Adopt a clear definition of anti-Muslim prejudice.

47. Use Remembrance Day to unite communities and mark our shared history.

An ongoing National Conversation

The findings of the National Conversation on Immigration provide an invaluable evidence base on public attitudes to immigration and integration, for policy-makers, local and national government, business and civil society and other stakeholders with an interest in this important issue. We hope it is of much use to them and would welcome approaches from those interested in learning more about our findings and/or with an interest in taking forward its recommendations.

Above all, the National Conversation on Immigration is a pilot which shows the value and feasibility of large-scale public engagement on issues of public salience; and which demonstrates that through such public engagement, it is possible to build consensus, even on issues which appear to be difficult and divisive. We hope, therefore, that the Government will take forward our key recommendation of sustained and ongoing public engagement on this issue in the form of an official National Conversation on Immigration. We strongly believe that such a commitment would play a significant role in rebuilding public trust and confidence in our immigration system.

Acknowledgements

British Future and HOPE not hate would like to thank our funders who have made this project possible: the Barrow Cadbury Trust, Jo Cox Foundation, the John Ellerman Foundation, the Paul Hamlyn Foundation, the Social Change Initiative as well as the core funders of our respective organisations. We are also grateful for the input of our project’s advisory panel.

The National Conversation on Immigration has collaborated with the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee and we would like to thank Yvette Cooper MP, her committee and its clerks for this opportunity. Finally, we would like to thank all those who have given up their time to talk to us or fill in our survey. Between them, they have shown that consensus is possible.
About us

BRITISH FUTURE

British Future is an independent, non-partisan thinktank seeking to involve people in an open conversation which addresses people’s hopes and fears about identity and integration, migration and opportunity, so that we feel confident about Britain’s Future.

We want to ensure that we engage those who are anxious about cultural identity and economic opportunity in Britain today, as well as those who already feel confident about our society, so that we can together identify workable solutions to make Britain the country we want to live in. Jill Rutter is Director of Strategy and Relationships at British Future.

www.britishfuture.org

HOPE NOT HATE

HOPE not hate uses research, education and public engagement to challenge mistrust and racism, and helps to build communities that are inclusive, celebrate shared identities and are resilient to hate. Hate is often the consequence of a loss of hope and an articulation of despair, but given an alternative, especially one that understands and addresses their anger, most people will choose HOPE over hate.

Our job is to expose and undermine groups that preach hate, intolerance and division whilst uniting communities around what they have in common. We aim to take a part in building a society that celebrates rather than scapegoats our differences. Rosie Carter is Research Officer at HOPE not hate.

www.hopenothate.org.uk

A full version of the National Conversation on Immigration final report is available to download online at
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